English summary: Now that it has managed to become a science, history must remain the symposium theatre which allows us to converse with the dead. Our "connected" world delivers us up, defenceless, to the tyranny of every instant. History could be the antidote, inasmuch as it is a depository of people's collective experience. It lifts shadows up from the depth of the ages to make us share what we have learned from being who we are. We have undertaken a boundless (...) dialogue with the living. This book proposes to restore the dialogue with the dead by revisiting, through a succession of brief texts in the form of short essays and short stories, a number of episodes of universal history in an attempt to cull some lessons from it. At a time when history's progress has led to an excessive specialisation which has caused many scholars to withdraw into their ivory towers to enjoy, among experts, the fruit of their research, Michel De Jaeghere wants us to resume meditating on examples that have nourished human thought since ancient times. French description: Ils ont ete pharaons, empereurs romains, rois de France, croises, missionnaires, conquerants, batisseurs de palais et de cathedrales, decouvreurs de mondes nouveaux. Ils ont connu l'ivresse de la gloire, l'amertume de la defaite, ils ont peine dans les travaux. Ils ont incarne l'aventure de l'Occident jusqu'aux extremites de la terre, ils ont du faire face a la barbarie, a la guerre, a la terreur et a la tyrannie totalitaires. De la profondeur de l'Egypte ancienne aux conflits qui ont ouvert le XXIe siecle, ils offrent la plus etonnante des galeries de portraits. Marc Aurele y croise Christophe Colomb, Louis XVI, Honore d'Estienne d'Orves ou Helie de Saint Marc. Ils forment la compagnie des ombres, surgie du passe pour nous offrir un tete a tete. Un dialogue singulier avec les morts.L'histoire est trop souvent traitee comme un cadavre par des medecins legistes si attentifs aux organes qu'ils prelevent sur le corps dont ils font l'autopsie que leur echappe son mystere, ce qui lui donnait sa vie meme. Elle est, ailleurs, consideree comme le divertissement d'un jour, l'occasion d'une promenade sans enjeu. Les textes reunis ici comme en un recueil de nouvelles voudraient s'inscrire dans une autre tradition, celle d'une histoire meditative: une histoire tournee vers la recherche de ce qu'elle a a nous dire d'essentiel, de vital sur nous-meme. Ils se proposent de convoquer les ombres du passe pour nous donner a contempler ce qui n'est pas mort avec elles. Nous doutons aujourd'hui que l'histoire puisse etre maitresse de vie: magistra vitae, disait Ciceron. Nous voulons croire que nous n'avons plus rien a apprendre d'elle. Il nous manque d'avoir les yeux ouverts sur ce qui fait echapper ses protagonistes a leur condition mortelle; ce qui leur donne leur part d'eternite. (shrink)

Telle est la sombre grandeur proposee desormais a l'historien contemporain : consacrer ses efforts a discrediter les auteurs anciens en montrant a quel point ils avaient ete tributaires de leurs aveuglements ; souligner les lacunes, la myopie, l'extravagance de leurs jugements ; debusquer prejuges de classe et stereotypes de genre ; dresser l'inventaire, la genealogie de leurs successives reinterpretations par chaque generation. Tenir en revanche leurs oeuvres pour un reservoir d'exemples, de modeles, de situations utiles pour guider notre reflexion, comme (...) le recommandait Plutarque, les considerer meme comme des chefs d'oeuvre d'une "inalterable actualite", parce qu'ils "savent dire ce que l'homme a d'humain" serait rester a la surface des choses, "dans l'ether de la culture classique". Se flatter de poursuivre avec ces vieux morts un dialogue que nos differences et notre eloignement releguent au rang de vain songe releverait de la naivete, de l'amateurisme et de l'outrecuidance. J'ai ecrit ce livre parce que je pense tout le contraire. Repudiant tout anachronisme simplificateur, mais refusant aussi de considerer le legs de l'Antiquite comme une beaute morte, infeconde, Michel De Jaeghere mobilise sa formation d'historien des idees, sa longue frequentation des auteurs antiques, et sa familiarite avec la politique contemporaine pour affronter une redoutable question : les Anciens sont-ils, en politique, encore de bon conseil? (shrink)

What makes it possible to affect one another, to move and be moved by another person? Why do some of our encounters transform us? The experience of moving one another points to the inter-affective in intersubjectivity. Inter-affection is hard to account for under a cognitivist banner, and has not received much attention in embodied work on intersubjectivity. I propose that understanding inter-affection needs a combination of insights into self-affection, embodiment, and interaction processes. I start from Michel Henry's radically immanent (...) idea of self-affection, and bring it into a contrastive dialogue with the enactive concepts of autonomy and (participatory) sense-making. I suggest that the latter ideas can open up Henry's idea of self-affection to inter-affection (something he aimed to do, but did not quite manage) and that, in turn, Henry's work can provide insights into underexplored elements of intersubjectivity, such as its ineffable and mysterious aspects, and erotic encounters. (shrink)

Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë , has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts of (...) thinking with and through movement. In this paper, I argue that a serious exploration of dance and movement does not merely bolster the enactivist view, but rather, it suggests a radical enactivism, as envisaged by, e.g., Hutto . To support this claim, I examine an account of “Thinking in Movement” provided by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone in order to highlight the ways in which intentional agency and meaning-making occur in improvisational dance. These processes, I further argue, closely mirror some of the key components of participatory sense making, as described by De Jaegher and Di Paolo :485–507, 2007). This is beneficial to my case, because it permits a discussion of “thought-full action” that does not depend upon standard cognitivist frameworks for explanation. By carefully focusing on how agency can help to separate mere “thrashing about” from meaningful movement, this paper aim to strengthen the position of radical enactivism from the unique perspective and dance and sense-making. (shrink)

As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...) that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only. (shrink)

An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are (...) more than a context for social cognition: they can complement and even replace individual mechanisms. This new explanatory power of social interaction can push the field forward by expanding the possibilities of scientific explanation beyond the individual. (shrink)

In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning. But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational (...) knowing to the detriment of engaged, human knowing pervades societal practices and institutions, often with harmful effects on people and their relations. There are many reasons why we need a new, engaged—or even engaging—epistemology of human knowing. The enactive theory of participatory sense-making takes steps towards this, but it needs deepening. Kym Maclaren’s idea of letting be invites such a deepening. Characterizing knowing as a relationship of letting be provides a nuanced way to deal with the tensions between the knower’s being and the being of the known, as they meet in the process of knowing-and-being-known. This meeting of knower and known is not easy to understand. However, there is a mode of relating in which we know it well, and that is: in loving relationships. I propose to look at human knowing through the lens of loving. We then see that both knowing and loving are existential, dialectic ways in which concrete and particular beings engage with each other. (shrink)

This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S.. Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher. Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social (...) interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon. (shrink)

Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as (...) both a characteristic of individual agents and of social interaction processes. We then propose a number of ways in which interactional autonomy can influence individuals. Then we discuss recent work in modeling on the one hand and psychological investigations on the other that support and illustrate this claim. Finally, we discuss some implications for research on social and individual agency. (shrink)

What does it take to see how autistic people participate in social interactions? And what does it take to support and invite more participation? Western medicine and cognitive science tend to think of autism mainly in terms of social and communicative deficits. But research shows that autistic people can interact with a skill and sophistication that are hard to see when starting from a deficit idea. Research also shows that not only autistic people, but also their non-autistic interaction partners can (...) have difficulties interacting with each other. To do justice to these findings, we need a different approach to autistic interactions—one that helps everyone see, invite, and support better participation. I introduce such an approach, based on the enactive theory of participatory sense-making and supported by insights from indigenous epistemologies. This approach helps counteract the homogenising tendencies of the “global mental health” movement, which attempts to erase rather than recognise difference, and often precludes respectful engagements. Based in the lived experiences of people in their socio-cultural-material and interactive contexts, I put forward an engaged—even engaging—epistemology for understanding how we interact across difference. From this perspective, we see participatory sense-making at work across the scientific, diagnostic, therapeutic, and everyday interactions of autistic and non-autistic people, and how everyone can invite and support more of it. (shrink)

Underlying the recent focus on embodied and interactive aspects of social understanding are several intuitions about what roles the body, interaction processes, and interpersonal experience play. In this paper, we introduce a systematic, hands-on method for investigating the experience of interacting and its role in intersubjectivity. Special about this method is that it starts from the idea that researchers of social understanding are themselves one of the best tools for their own investigations. The method provides ways for researchers to calibrate (...) and to trust themselves as sophisticated instruments to help generate novel insights into human interactive experience. We present the basics of the method, and two empirical studies. The first is a video-study on autism, which shows greater refinement in the way people with autism embody their social interactions than previously thought. The second is a study of thinking in live interactions, which provides insight into the common feeling that too much thinking can hamper interaction, and into how this kind of interactional awkwardness might be unblocked. (shrink)

This paper combines a survey of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics with new models that fill some voids in that literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in (...) the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibrium-refinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of pragmatic inference. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: I propose that getting the empirical study of subjective experience off to a good start requires an intersubjective approach, in both theory and method, where intersubjectivity is understood not in the standard science way of verification by others, but rather as participation in the investigation of how experience transforms when examining it together. I argue that this will greatly help do justice to and (...) respect experience’s special transforming and transformative nature. (shrink)

This paper develops a model of persuasive demand inducement in the expert–client relationship. The expert frames the decision on whether or not to buy expert services faced by a client with prospect-theoretic preferences, by making the client see this decision from the perspective of a particular reference point. When inducing a client to buy risky curative services, the expert should set a high reference point, and frame all outcomes as losses. When instead inducing a client to buy safe preventive services, (...) as long as the client’s loss aversion is sufficiently high, the expert should set an intermediate reference point, framing high outcomes as gains and low outcomes as losses. (shrink)

An important amount of research effort in psychology and neuroscience over the past decades has focused on the problem of social cognition. This problem is understood as how we figure out other minds, relying only on indirect manifestations of other people's intentional states, which are assumed to be hidden, private and internal. Research on this question has mostly investigated how individual cognitive mechanisms achieve this task. A shift in the internalist assumptions regarding intentional states has expanded the research focus with (...) hypotheses that explore the role of interactive phenomena and interpersonal histories and their implications for understanding individual cognitive processes. This interactive expansion of the conceptual and methodological toolkit for investigating social cognition, we now propose, can be followed by an expansion into wider and deeply-related research questions, beyond (but including) that of social cognition narrowly construed. Our social lives are populated by different kinds of cognitive and affective phenomena that are related to but not exhausted by the question of how we figure out other minds. These phenomena include acting and perceiving together, verbal and non-verbal engagement, experiences of (dis- )connection, management of relations in a group, joint meaning-making, intimacy, trust, conflict, negotiation, asymmetric relations, material mediation of social interaction, collective action, contextual engagement with socio-cultural norms, structures and roles, etc. These phenomena are often characterized by a strong participation by the cognitive agent in contrast with the spectatorial stance typical of social cognition research. We use the broader notion of embodied intersubjectivity to refer to this wider set of phenomena. This Research Topic aims to investigate relations between these different issues, to help lay strong foundations for a science of intersubjectivity - the social mind writ large. To contribute to this goal, we encouraged contributions in psychology, neuroscience, psychopathology, philosophy, and cognitive science that address this wider scope of intersubjectivity by extending the range of explanatory factors from purely individual to interactive, from observational to participatory"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Pregnancy presents some interesting challenges for the philosophy of embodied cognition. Mother and fetus are generally considered to be passive during pregnancy, both individually and in their relation. In this paper, we use the enactive operational concepts of autonomy, agency, individuation, and participation to examine the relation between mother and fetus in utero. Based on biological, physiological, and phenomenological research, we explore the emergence of agentive capacities in embryo and fetus, as well as how maternal agency changes as pregnancy advances. (...) We show that qualitatively different kinds of agency have their beginnings already in utero, and to what extent fetal and maternal movement modulate affectivity and individuation in pregnancy. We thus propose that mother and fetus are both agents who participate in pregnancy. Pregnancy then emerges as a relational developmental organization that anchors and holds its developing participants. We end the paper with reflections on ethical implications of this proposal, and suggestions for future research. (shrink)

Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of (...) social understanding as an ongoing, dynamical process of participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. This process may be described (1) from a dynamical agentive systems point of view as an interaction and coordination of two embodied agents; (2) from a phenomenological approach as a mutual incorporation, i.e. a process in which the lived bodies of both participants extend and form a common intercorporality. Intersubjectivity, it is argued, is not a solitary task of deciphering or simulating the movements of others but means entering a process of embodied interaction and generating common meaning through it. This approach will be further illustrated by an analysis of primary dyadic interaction in early childhood. (shrink)

In a paper from the late 1990s, Francisco Varela indicates that a science of inter-being is on the horizon. But how to envisage such a science? Here I propose that an enactive science of inter-being will benefit from engaging with recent innovative autism research that starts from autistic experience and intersubjectivity. Properly intersubjective autism research is both more ethically just and scientifically richer than cognitivist explanations that have dominated research, discourse, and practice for a long time, and which have tended (...) to set people apart more than connect them. I discuss the work of Bervoets and Hens (2020), who show how autism research is unavoidably theorethical, and must be in order to move past the catch-22 they identify between autism and dysfunction. This kind of research exemplifies a participatory sense-making between subjects and scientists, and it is here that 'steps to a science of inter-being' (Varela, 1999a) are being taken. (shrink)

Wat gebeurt er allemaal in relaties? We raken gefrustreerd wanneer een vriend niet terugbelt. We missen een geliefde die ver weg is. We komen elkaar tegen op straat. We vrijen. We voelen ons eenzaam. Soms terwijl we vrijen. We voelen ons diep met iemand verbonden. We verwachten veel. We doen ons best om niet te veel te verwachten. Soms lukt dat, en dan kunnen we elkaar echt ontmoeten. Dit boek gaat over de spanningen die in elke relatie aanwezig zijn. In (...) romantische relaties, maar ook in andere. Je verhoudt je tot de anderen en tot jezelf. Maar je verhoudt je ook tot de verhouding zelf. Dat is een nieuw idee in de cognitiewetenschappen. Daar gaat het veel vaker over kennen, dan over liefhebben. Maar wat als kennen en liefhebben eigenlijk heel dicht bij elkaar zouden liggen? In dit boek breekt cognitiefilosoof Hanne De Jaegher een lans om kennen en liefhebben samen te bestuderen. Want allebei zijn het geëngageerde relaties vol spanningen. Zo schrijft de auteur een wonderlijk nieuw hoofdstuk in de filosofie van de liefde. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray’s account of (...) love to present a phenomenology of loving interactions and then our enactive account. Finally, we draw some implications for ethics. These concern language, difference, vulnerability, desire, and self-transformation. (shrink)

The blooming desert or ‘El desierto florido’ in Spanish, is a millenarian climate pattern caused by El Niño that warms the surface waters in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean and creates the conditions for rain in the Altiplano and the Atacama Desert, north of Chile. After some millimeters of abundant rain, a rich biotic community emerges, and in a matter of hours or days, the driest surface on Earth becomes an impressive colorful habitat for more than two hundred different species (...) of eye-catching flowers that host the desert biotic life. Unfortunately, this breathtaking display of colors coexists with less appealing but equally astonishing landscapes. The Atacama Desert harbors the largest accumulation of discarded clothing worldwide and the largest pools of lithium mining which require vast amounts of water for their production. Every year, approximately 56,000 tons of used clothing, predominantly consisting of fast fashion polyester products, water-intensive cotton fabrics, and equally polluting material scraps, are deposited, forming toxic mountains of waste. This article presents an interpretation of these distinct landscapes as interconnected realities of the dump that illustrate the impact of biocultural semiocides, whereby the loss of relationships and meanings with Earth materials is shaped by glocal forces. By making this argument, the article contends that the Atacama region replicates the conditions of the Earth as a global dumping and solastalgia, namely ‘the pain caused by the loss of solace and the sense of desolation connected to one´s home and territory.’. (shrink)

Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...) cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action, an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure—both constrain and empower— social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Loving the Earth by Loving a Place: A Situated Approach to the Love of Nature” by Laura Candiotto. Abstract: We highlight the radicalness of Candiotto’s proposal, by following the flow of the conceptual devices that create a new language for deepening ways of thinking and enacting our relation with the Earth, in terms of loving sense-making, enactive listening, and becoming native.

Enactive cognitive science combines questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics by conceiving of bodies as open-ended and mutually transforming through activity. While enaction is not a theory of ethics, it can contribute to its foundations. We present a schematization of enactive ideas that underlie traditional distinctions between Being, Knowing, and Doing. Ethics in this scheme begins in the relation between knowing and becoming. Critical of dichotomous thinking, we approach the questions of alterity and ethical reality. Alterity is relevant to the (...) enactive approach, but not in the radical sense of transcendental arguments. We propose difference, instead, as a more generative concept. Following Simondon, we see norms and values manifest in webs of past and future acts together with their potentialities for becoming. We propose a transindividual concept of moral attunement that includes ethical know-how and consciousness raising. Through generative difference and attunement to configurations of becoming, enaction underpins an ethics of participation linking virtue ethics and ethics of care. (shrink)

A superb achievement, one that successfully brings together in accessible form the work of two major writers of Renaissance France. This is now the default version of Montaigne in English. --Timothy Hampton, Professor of French and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley.

La contribution de Michel Troper à la théorie générale du droit et à la théorie constitutionnelle est aujourd'hui reconnue et célébrée un peu partout dans le monde. Un talent d'architecte se tient à l'origine de cette audience rarement égalée dans la sphère francophone : celui qu'il faut pour accommoder toutes les exigences, quel que soit l'ordre de valeur dans lequel on les trouve : originalité, rigueur, souci de la fonction, esthétisme, solidité, adaptation, intelligence, inquiétude, esprit critique, renoncement, réalisme... A (...) ces mérites, on ajoutera une curiosité insatiable, un goût prononcé pour l'échange et le débat, un refus distingué de l'académisme, un sens exigeant de l'amitié et une méfiance profônde pour les adjectifs... C'est cet édifice de qualités que les élèves, collègues et amis de Michel Troper sont heureux de célébrer en lui offrant ces Mélanges. (shrink)

Under the pretense of defending an obscure treatise by a Catalan theologian, Sebond, Montaigne attacks the philosophers who attempt rational explanations of the universe and argues for a skeptical Christianity based squarely on faith rather than reason. The result is the _Apology for Raymond Sebond_, a classic of Counter-Reformation thought and a masterpiece of Renaissance literature. This new translation by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene achieves both accuracy and fluency, conveying at once the nuances of Montaigne’s arguments and his distinctive (...) literary style. (shrink)

A novel theoretical framework for an embodied, non-representational approach to language that extends and deepens enactive theory, bridging the gap between sensorimotor skills and language. -/- Linguistic Bodies offers a fully embodied and fully social treatment of human language without positing mental representations. The authors present the first coherent, overarching theory that connects dynamical explanations of action and perception with language. Arguing from the assumption of a deep continuity between life and mind, they show that this continuity extends to language. (...) Expanding and deepening enactive theory, they offer a constitutive account of language and the co-emergent phenomena of personhood, reflexivity, social normativity, and ideality. Language, they argue, is not something we add to a range of existing cognitive capacities but a new way of being embodied. Each of us is a linguistic body in a community of other linguistic bodies. The book describes three distinct yet entangled kinds of human embodiment, organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective; it traces the emergence of linguistic sensitivities and introduces the novel concept of linguistic bodies; and it explores the implications of living as linguistic bodies in perpetual becoming, applying the concept of linguistic bodies to questions of language acquisition, parenting, autism, grammar, symbol, narrative, and gesture, and to such ethical concerns as microaggression, institutional speech, and pedagogy. (shrink)

Diderot escreve, na Enciclopédia, um longo verbete, “Tear de meias”, no qual compara o tear a um raciocínio cuja conclusão seria o têxtil. Ele retoma esta comparação na Refutação de Helvétius: ali, é o próprio Leibniz que se torna uma máquina de reflexão, similar ao “tear de meias”. A opção materialista do homem máquina retoma uma tradição que assimila o texto ao tecido. Encontramos a mesma imagem no Fausto de Goethe, que é citado por Freud em A interpretação dos sonhos, (...) e na novela de Henry James O motivo no tapete. A invenção é sempre cruzamento, tecelagem e mestiçagem, numa interação entre criação técnica e representação da atividade intelectual. O sistema de programação dos teares foi posteriormente adaptado às primeiras máquinas analíticas, ancestrais de nossos computadores atuais. A Enciclopédia teorizou esta interação, reabilitando os teares e concebendo o pensamento como um trabalho. (shrink)

A fundamental fact about human minds is that they are never truly alone: all minds are steeped in situated interaction. That social interaction matters is recognized by any experimentalist who seeks to exclude its influence by studying individuals in isolation. On this view, interaction complicates cognition. Here, we explore the more radical stance that interaction co-constitutes cognition: that we benefit from looking beyond single minds toward cognition as a process involving interacting minds. All around the cognitive sciences, there are approaches (...) that put interaction center stage. Their diverse and pluralistic origins may obscure the fact that collectively, they harbor insights and methods that can respecify foundational assumptions and fuel novel interdisciplinary work. What might the cognitive sciences gain from stronger interactional foundations? This represents, we believe, one of the key questions for the future. Writing as a transdisciplinary collective assembled from across the classic cognitive science hexagon and beyond, we highlight the opportunity for a figure-ground reversal that puts interaction at the heart of cognition. The interactive stance is a way of seeing that deserves to be a key part of the conceptual toolkit of cognitive scientists. (shrink)

A presente pesquisa tem por finalidade demonstrar o fio condutor que rege toda a história universal para Immanuel Kant. A metodologia a ser utilizada se baseia na pesquisa qualitativa do tipo bibliográfica, pela qual trabalharemos a edição bilíngue (Alemão-Português) da obra: “Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita”. É de se verificar que a história universal se ocupa da narrativa das ações humanas, a saber, de suas manifestações. Nesta perspectiva Kant busca uma apreensão filosófica da história (...) universal, acompanhando um plano oculto da própria natureza que busca efetivar uma constituição política perfeita. Assim para atingirmos nosso objetivo de explicitar o fio condutor da história universal, analisaremos primeiramente o homem como o único ser racional sobre a face da terra, como também, a exigência de se cultivar esta mesma razão no âmbito da espécie e da história. Em um segundo momento, trabalharemos o antagonismo como motor que desperta os talentos humanos e os faz superar sua tendência à preguiça. Temos aqui o aparecimento da “astúcia da razão” que se utiliza dos vícios (tais como: projeção, ânsia de dominação e vaidade) para alcançar o desenvolvimento cultural e garantir uma sociedade na qual a liberdade se expressa sob leis civis. Por fim, abordaremos ainda as relações internacionais entre Estados e a elaboração de um Estado cosmopolita universal. Chega-se ao resultado, que para Kant, o conjunto da história humana é a efetivação de um plano oculto da própria natureza que procura estabelecer uma constituição política perfeita tanto internamente, como, externamente. (shrink)

The enactive approach to cognition distinctively emphasizes autonomy, adaptivity, agency, meaning, experience, and interaction. Taken together, these principles can provide the new sciences of language with a comprehensive philosophical framework: languaging as adaptive social sense-making. This is a refinement and advancement on Maturana’s idea of languaging as a manner of living. Overcoming limitations in Maturana’s initial formulation of languaging is one of three motivations for this paper. Another is to give a response to skeptics who challenge enactivism to connect “lower-level” (...) sense-making with “higher-order” sophisticated moves like those commonly ascribed to language. Our primary goal is to contribute a positive story developed from the enactive account of social cognition, participatory sense-making. This concept is put into play in two different philosophical models, which respectively chronicle the logical and ontogenetic development of languaging as a particular form of social agency. Languaging emerges from the interplay of coordination and exploration inherent in the primordial tensions of participatory sense-making between individual and interactive norms; it is a practice that transcends the self-other boundary and enables agents to regulate self and other as well as interaction couplings. Linguistic sense-makers are those who negotiate interactive and internalized ways of meta-regulating the moment-to-moment activities of living and cognizing. Sense-makers in enlanguaged environments incorporate sensitivities, roles, and powers into their unique yet intelligible linguistic bodies. We dissolve the problematic dichotomies of high/low, online/offline, and linguistic/nonlinguistic cognition, and we provide new boundary criteria for specifying languaging as a prevalent kind of human social sense-making. (shrink)

Prompted by our commentators, we take this response as an opportunity to clarify the premises, attitudes, and methods of our enactive approach to human languaging. We high-light the need to recognize that any investigation, particularly one into language, is always a concretely situated and self-grounding activity; our attitude as researchers is one of knowing as engagement with our subject matter. Our task, formulating the missing categories that can bridge embodied cognitive science with language research, requires avoiding premature abstractions and clarifying (...) the multiple circularities at play. Our chosen method is dialectical, which has prompted several interesting observations that we respond to, particularly with respect to what this method means for enactive epistemology and ontology. We also clarify the important question of how best to conceive of the variety of social skills we progressively identify with our method and are at play in human languaging. Are these skills socially constituted or just socially learned? The difference, again, leads to a clarification that acts, skills, actors, and interactions are to be conceived as co-emerging categories. We illustrate some of these points with a discussion of an example of aspects of the model at play in a study of gift giving in China.Keywords: Enactive epistemology, Enactive ontology, Dialectics, languaging, Shared know-how. (shrink)

A presente pesquisa traz uma análise sobre a efetivação da liberdade no interior da sociedade civil burguesa, mais especificamente no Sistema das Carências, bem como sua relação direta com o trabalho livre. Para tanto, foi necessário à utilização da obra: "Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito ou Direito natural e ciência do Estado em Compêndio" do autor Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. O objetivo é demonstrar o aspecto espiritual do trabalho, este que para Hegel assume um valor fundamental de libertação, pois (...) possibilita ao homem se erguer de uma pura determinação imediata e natural para uma esfera de criação da cultura. O método de exposição da presente pesquisa se dá na forma da Dialética especulativa que ressalta o movimento de libertação exposto no Sistema das Carências através do trabalho. Portanto, o trabalho adquire um aspecto positivo que possibilita o eu (ich) alcançar a satisfação das necessidades sociais, tendo como resultado a libertação da natureza. (shrink)